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SYMMETRIES AND ISOMORPHISMS FOR PRIVACY IN CONTROL OVER THE
CLOUD*
ALIMZHAN SULTANGAZIN AND PAULO TABUADA
Abstract. Cloud computing platforms are being increasingly used for closing feedback control loops, es-
pecially when computationally expensive algorithms, such as model-predictive control, are used to optimize
performance. Outsourcing of control algorithms entails an exchange of data between the control system and
the cloud, and, naturally, raises concerns about the privacy of the control system’s data (e.g., state trajectory,
control objective). Moreover, any attempt at enforcing privacy needs to add minimal computational overhead
to avoid degrading control performance. In this paper, we propose several transformation-based methods for
enforcing data privacy. We also quantify the amount of provided privacy and discuss how much privacy is
lost when the adversary has access to side knowledge. We address three different scenarios: a) the cloud has
no knowledge about the system being controlled; b) the cloud knows what sensors and actuators the system
employs but not the system dynamics; c) the cloud knows the system dynamics, its sensors, and actuators. In
all of these three scenarios, the proposed methods allow for the control over the cloud without compromising
private information (which information is considered private depends on the considered scenario).
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. The recent advances in reliability and speed of communication have led to an increased use
of cloud-based services, which provide computation and data storage capabilities to clients. Control over the
cloud [34, 14, 15] has numerous advantages, which include easier installation and maintenance [21], and the
availability of global information from all of the cloud’s clients when making control decisions. However, the
main advantage of control over the cloud is that it allows control systems to outsource expensive computational
tasks to the cloud, thus potentially improving the speed of computation and freeing the local computational
capabilities for other tasks.
An illustrative example of the benefits of outsourcing computing can be observed in Model Predictive Control
(MPC). MPC is a conceptually simple, yet powerful scheme that was adopted in industry for multivariable
control [23]. MPC inherently involves solving complex constrained optimization problems on-line (i.e., within
one sampling interval). The work in [34] presents an experimental study that shows feasibility of MPC over
the cloud for robot control. Another work (see [14]) considered the practicality and benefits of cloud-based
MPC for a large-scale solar plant. The availability of global information provided by control over the cloud
can have many practical benefits, as shown in [15]. There, the authors propose a solution to the problem of
traffic flow estimation via the cloud.
However, relying on a third-party to perform computation is not without its dangers. Despite the benefits of
control over the cloud, a number of studies have shown that exposing existing systems to connectivity may
lead to security vulnerabilities in a vast variety of applications [5, 13, 6, 12], including control of process plants,
traffic infrastructure, and smart meter systems. Cyber-security attacks vary based on the amount of resources
the attacker possesses [31]. One of the most basic attacks that requires little resources is eavesdropping. It
can often serve as a stepping stone in the implementation of more complex attacks [24]. In control over
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the cloud, eavesdropping involves the adversary listening in to the communication channel between sensors,
controllers, and actuators to leak valuable information about the model, the controller, and trajectories [10].
The client is expected to disclose all of this sensitive information to the cloud if it intends to receive valid
control inputs from it. For example, we would expect drivers to share their locations, final destinations and,
perhaps, dynamics to successfully allow traffic control over the cloud.
Eavesdropping attacks are usually prevented with encryption - the plant and the cloud establish a shared
key with which they encrypt transmitted messages and decrypt the received ones. However, if the adversary
manages to undermine the security of the cloud (e.g., gain unauthorized access to its memory), this technique
can no longer protect the system since the cloud accesses the decrypted data. As stated in [26], traditional
IT security provides only a partial solution. Therefore, there is a pressing need for development of control-
over-the-cloud methods that do not rely on decryption of the incoming data. Although much effort has been
directed to this problem, a universally secure scheme for control over the cloud that could support any client
functionality has not yet been created [32, 2]. When solving the problem of private control over the cloud, two
other important concerns need to be accounted for: efficiency and safety. Privacy cannot come at the cost of
degradation of control performance either due to delays in the feedback loop or inaccurate control inputs.
1.2. Related work. The body of work on privacy in control over the cloud can be categorized into methods
based on homomorphic encryption, differential privacy, and algebraic transformations.
When using homomorphic encryption techniques, the cloud is able to perform the computations on encrypted
data without the need to decrypt it [3]. As a result, the cloud can implement optimization algorithms using
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), as done in [17, 11]. However, FHE is inefficient in terms of execution time
[3], which makes it impractical for online optimization. Therefore, partially homomorphic encryption (PHE),
a simpler form of FHE only allowing for a subset of operations to be performed on encrypted data, has become
more popular in connection to privacy in control over the cloud. While PHE methods are shown to be feasible
and are able to provide privacy guarantees [9, 10, 21, 27, 2, 1], execution time, which grows disproportionally
with an increase in key length [10, 2], remains a valid concern in these methods. A consequence of this is that
using homomorphic encrypion may potentially lead to instability in the controlled system due to processing
delays. To address this problem, some works (see [10]) have shown that encryption parameters can be chosen
to ensure stability of the closed-loop performance, thus providing a natural trade-off between security and
control performance. The practical feasibility of encrypted control systems has been validated in [16] by
considering control of a DC motor in real time.
Inspired by studies in privacy of databases, the problem of privacy in control over the cloud has also been
approached from the standpoint of differential privacy (see [7, 18]). This technique ensures that the risk of
losing privacy of a single user's data by means of data queries is low. The main idea of these methods is
to perturb the response to a data query with appropriate noise [8]. However, to achieve more privacy, the
user must sacrifice accuracy (i.e., add more noise), which, in the context of control, degrades the control
performance.
The ideas behind algebraic transformation methods have initially stemed from works on privacy in optimiza-
tion. The idea is to use algebraic transformations to produce a different, but equivalent optimization problem.
In other words, although the cloud does not know the original optimization problem, it can provide the client
with an optimal solution to an equivalent optimization problem from which the client is able to recover the
optimal solution to the original problem. Although initially these methods found application exclusively in
linear programs [22, 35], several efforts have been directed to providing a unified framework and generalizing
them to convex optimization problems (see [37, 36]). The work in [37] also shows one of the first attempls
to define and quantify privacy of transformation-based methods. Algebraic transformation methods found
applications in control due to their efficiency and guaranteed optimality of the solution [36]. For example, in
[39] the authors propose a hybrid transformation-based method to preserve privacy of an MPC controller in
networked control systems. In [38], transformation-based methods are used to provide privacy in a specific
problem AC Optimal Power Flow.
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1.3. Contributions. This paper focuses on the use of transformation-based methods to preserve privacy of
the system dynamics, control objective and constraints, and system trajectories. The contributions of this
paper are fourfold:
(1) we propose using isomorphisms and symmetries of control systems as a source of transformations so
as to keep data private;
(2) we quantify the privacy guaranteed by these methods via the dimension of the set that describes the
uncertainty experienced by the adversary;
(3) we quantify how much privacy is lost when the adversary is assumed to have access to side knowledge;
(4) we show that the proposed method is computationally light as it only requires matrix multiplications.
The method proposed in this paper was initially introduced in [29]. In [28], it was extended to networked
control systems with several agents requesting control input from a single cloud. In [30], the dimension of
the set describing the uncertainty experienced by the adversary was proposed as a measure of privacy for this
method and was evaluated for the special case of free group actions. This paper provides a unified presentation
of the results in [29, 30] with simpler proofs and several new results, such as the bounds on privacy when the
group action is not free and an exact quantification of privacy for prime systems.
While privacy quantification in optimization has been studied in [36], this work considers how much privacy
is preserved in the more challenging context of control. Moreover, the measure of privacy proposed in this
work has been chosen to be suitable for problems of optimization in control systems and, therefore, is different
from any of those proposed in [36]. Although the application of transformation-based methods in control has
been previously discussed in [39], the scheme proposed there only considers a special case, where the cloud
optimizes the weighted sum of the norms of the input and state, and the state is taken to be the output of the
system. Our algorithm can be applied to a wider class of problems as we allow for arbitrary quadratic costs,
linear constraints and outputs different from the state.
2. Problem Definition
2.1. Plant dynamics and control objective. We consider discrete-time affine plants, denoted by Σ, and
described by:
(2.1) Σ :
x¯k+1 = A¯x¯k + B¯uk + c¯
y¯k = C¯x¯k + d¯,
where A¯ ∈ Rn×n, B¯ ∈ Rn×m, C¯ ∈ Rp×n, c¯ ∈ Rn, and d¯ ∈ Rp describe the dynamics of the system, and
x¯k ∈ R
n, uk ∈ R
m and y¯k ∈ R
p denote the state, input and output of the system at time k, respectively.
We assume that system Σ is controllable and observable. We also assume, without loss of generality, that
ker B¯ = {0} and Im C¯ = Rp, since we can always eliminate linearly dependent columns (resp. rows) from B¯
(resp. C¯).
To simplify notation, we lift every affine map Wx+ v to a linear map through the following construction:
(2.2) Wx+ v 7→
[
W v
0 1
] [
x
1
]
.
Applying (2.2) to (2.1):
(2.3)
xk+1 ,
[
x¯k+1
1
]
=
[
A¯ c¯
0 1
] [
x¯k
1
]
+
[
B¯
0
]
uk
, Axk +Buk
yk ,
[
y¯k
1
]
=
[
C¯ d¯
0 1
] [
x¯k
1
]
, Cxk.
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In the remainder of the paper we suppress the inner structure for simplicity and represent all the systems in
the linear form (2.3). However, the reader is advised to remember that we are dealing with affine maps. This
is also true for the affine maps we will use to define isomorphisms.
We refer to system (2.3) as the triple Σ = (A,B,C). We call a triple {xk, uk, yk}k∈N a trajectory of Σ if it
satisfies (2.1) for all k ∈ N.
Additionally, we define a cost function J : Rn × (Rm)N+1 → R for N ∈ N ∪ {+∞} that allows to compare
trajectories and, thus, to formulate different control objectives. In alignment with the linear framework, we
consider quadratic cost functions given by:
J(x, u) =
N∑
i=0
∆ηTi M∆ηi,(2.4)
where ∆ηi =
[
xi − x
∗
i ui − u
∗
i
]T
, x = {x0, ..., xN} and u = {u0, ..., uN}. The sequences x
∗ = {x∗0, ..., x
∗
N}
and u∗ = {u∗0, ..., u
∗
N} denote the reference trajectories to be tracked. We define M ∈ R
(n+m+1)×(n+m+1) to
be a positive-definite matrix. Due to the lift (2.2), this cost includes not only quadratic, but also linear terms.
In addition to a cost, we also consider control objectives that require certain constraints to be satisfied at all
times. These constraints are defined as:
Dηi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N},(2.5)
where ηi =
[
xi ui
]T
and D ∈ Rh×(n+m+1). Note that, despite appearing to be linear constraints, the
constraints above are in fact affine, in view of the construction (2.2).
2.2. Attack model and privacy objectives. The cloud is treated as a curious but honest adversary: the
cloud adheres to the computations prescribed by an agreed-upon protocol, but may seek to extract and leak
confidential information by keeping record of all computations and communicated messages.
The interaction between the plant and the cloud is performed in two steps. During the first step, called the
handshaking, the plant provides the cloud with a suitably modified version of the plant model, cost, and
constraints. In exchange, the cloud agrees to compute the input minimizing the provided cost, subject to the
constraints and plant dynamics. During the second step, called plant execution, the plant repeatedly sends
a suitably modified version of its measurements to the cloud. The cloud computes a new input based on the
received measurements and sends it to the plant, where it is suitably modified before being applied to the
plant.
In the previous paragraph we purposely used the vague expression “suitably modified”. Making this expression
more concrete requires that we first define the knowledge available to the plant. We consider the following
three scenarios.
Problem 2.1 (Scenario 1). Assuming the cloud has no knowledge about the plant:
(1) how to modify the plant (A,B,C), cost J , and constraint matrix D before sending them during the
handshaking step,
(2) how to modify the measurements sent to the plant, and
(3) how to modify the inputs received from the plant,
so that the plant’s trajectory minimizes cost J in (2.4), while preventing the cloud from learning the plant
(A,B,C), the cost J , the constraint matrix D, and the plant’s trajectory {xk, uk, yk}k∈N?
Problem 2.2 (Scenario 2). Assuming the cloud has no knowledge about the plant except for knowing what
are its sensors and actuators:
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(1) how to modify the plant (A,B,C), cost J , and constraint matrix D before sending them during the
handshaking step;
(2) how to modify the measurements sent to the plant, and
(3) how to modify the inputs received from the plant,
so that the plant’s trajectory minimizes cost J in (2.4), while preventing the cloud from learning the plant
(A,B,C), the cost J , the constraint matrix D, and the plant’s trajectory {xk, uk, yk}k∈N?
Problem 2.3 (Scenario 3). Assuming the cloud has complete knowledge about the plant dynamics, including
its sensors and actuators:
(1) how to modify cost J , and constraint matrix D before sending them alongside the plant (A,B,C)
during the handshaking step;
(2) how to modify the measurements sent to the plant, and
(3) how to modify the inputs received from the plant,
so that the plant’s trajectory minimizes cost J in (2.4), while preventing the cloud from learning the cost J ,
the constraint matrix D, and the plant’s trajectory {xk, uk, yk}k∈N?
These problems are solved in Section 4 by utilizing isomorphisms and symmetries of control systems we define
next in Section 3.
3. Isomorphisms and
symmetries of control systems
In this section, we introduce the notions of isomorphism and symmetry of control systems along with several
technical results used in Section 4 to provide a solution to the problems described in Section 2.
Let us denote by Sn,m,p the set of all controllable and observable linear control systems with state, input and
output dimensions n, m, and p, respectively.
Definition 3.1. An isomorphism of control systems in Sn,m,p is a quadruple ψ = (P, F,G, S) consisting of a
change of state coordinates P : Rn → Rn, state feedback F : Rn → Rm, a change of coordinates in the input
space G : Rm → Rm, and a change of coordinates in the output space S : Rp → Rp. Transformations P and
S are affine invertible maps, F is an affine map and G is a linear invertible map.
Recall that, to simplify notation, we lift the affine maps to linear maps using the transformation (2.2).
Let us also denote the set of isomorphisms of Sn,m,p described in Definition 3.1 as Gn,m,p. The set Gn,m,p
forms a group under function composition as the group operation1. This allows us to define a group action of
Gn,m,p on the set of linear control systems Sn,m,p.
Definition 3.2. Each element ψ ∈ Gn,m,p acts on Σ ∈ Sn,m,p to produce ψ∗Σ given by:
(3.1)
ψ∗Σ = (P, F,G, S)∗(A,B,C)
= (P (A−BG−1F )P−1, PBG−1, SCP−1)
, (A˜, B˜, C˜) , Σ˜.
The map ψ∗ is called an isomorphism action. We also say that systems Σ and Σ˜ are equivalent.
1A composition of two isomorphisms is given by ψ2 ◦ ψ1 = (P2P1, G2F1 + F2P1, G2G1, S2S1), the identity is ψe = (I, 0, I, I)
and the inverse is given by ψ−1 = (P−1,−G−1FP,G−1, S−1).
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An isomorphism maps the state xk, input uk, and output yk of system Σ to the state x˜k, input u˜k, and output
y˜k of system Σ˜ as follows:
x˜k = Pxk(3.2)
u˜k = Fxk +Guk(3.3)
y˜k = Syk.(3.4)
Similarly, an isomorphism induces transformation on the control objectives — i.e., the cost and constraints.
The effect of ψ on ηk can be represented by:
η˜k =
[
x˜k
u˜k
]
=
[
P 0
F G
] [
xk
uk
]
, Lηk.(3.5)
Therefore, the cost function J can be expressed as a function of the sequence of modified states x˜ = {x˜0, ..., x˜N}
and the sequence of modified inputs u˜ = {u0, ..., u˜N} as follows:
J˜(x˜, u˜) =ψ∗J (x, u) =
N∑
i=0
∆η˜Ti M˜∆η˜i,(3.6)
where M˜ = L−TML−1. Applying the isomorphism action to the constraints in (2.5) yields:
D˜η˜i ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N},(3.7)
where D˜ = ψ∗D = DL
−1.
The effect of an isomorphism on the system, trajectory, cost and constraints will be used in Section 4 to
prevent the cloud from learning them.
For a given system Σ, there is a special subgroup of Gn,m,p called the symmetry group of Σ, which is defined
by the following property.
Definition 3.3. Let Σ ∈ Sn,m,p. An isomorphism ψ ∈ Gn,m,p is said to be a symmetry of Σ if ψ∗Σ = Σ. The
subgroup of symmetries of Σ is denoted here as Kn,m,p(Σ).
The notion of isomorphism was crafted to preserve properties of control systems. Among these, trajectories
have a special significance. A simple induction argument can be used to establish the following result.
Lemma 3.4. Let Σ ∈ Sn,m,p and ψ ∈ Gn,m,p. If Σ˜ = ψ∗Σ and {xk, uk, yk}k∈N is a trajectory of Σ, then
{x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N, as given by (3.2) - (3.4), is a valid trajectory of Σ˜.
This means that if the cloud receives Σ˜ during the handshaking step, then the received sequence of mea-
surements y˜ and the produced sequence of control inputs u˜ in the subsequent execution step are compatible
with the plant Σ˜. To elaborate, both the modified measurements y˜ and modified control inputs u˜ would be
compatible with modified dynamics Σ˜.
Let us now define S¯n,m,p to be a set of quadruples Ω , {Σ, J,D, {xk, yk, uk}}k∈N such that {xk, yk, uk} is a
trajectory of a linear system Σ ∈ Sn,m,p minimizing cost function J under constraints D.
Lemma 3.5. The set S¯n,m,p is a smooth manifold.
Proof. We can see that S¯n,m,p is, in fact, the Cartesian product of Sn,m,p with the set of cost functions
M++(m+n+1,R), defined by positive-definite matrices, with the set of constraintsMd(h× (m+n+1),R),
defined by the set of full-rank matrices, where d = min{h,m+ n+1}. It is known that the product space is a
smooth manifold if its constituents are smooth manifolds [20, p. 21]. It remains to show that these constinuents
are indeed smooth manifolds.
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Let us construct the map:
(3.8)
fS :R
n×(n+1) × Rn×m × Rp×(n+1) → R2
(A,B,C) 7→ (det C, det O) ,
where C and O are the controllability and observability matrices of the dynamics (A,B,C). It can be seen that
Sn,m,p = f
−1
S (R
2 \ (0, 0)). The function fS is continuous since each of its elements is defined by a polynomial
function of the elements of (A,B,C). Given that for continuous functions the preimage of every open set is
an open set, we have that Sn,m,p is an open subset of the domain of fS . Seeing that the domain of fS is a
smooth manifold, Sn,m,p is a smooth manifold of dimension n(n+ 1) + nm+ p(n+ 1).
The set of positive-definite matrices M++(m + n+ 1,R) is shown to be a smooth embedded submanifold of
R
(m+n+1)×(m+n+1) of dimension (m+ n+ 1)(m+ n+ 2)/2 in [33].
The set of full-rank matrices Md(h× (m+ n+ 1),R) is a smooth manifold of dimension h(m+ n+ 1) [20, p.
19]. 
Similarly to Sn,m,p, we can define a group action of Gn,m,p on S¯n,m,p in view of the previous discussion.
Therefore, we can use the isomorphism action of Gn,m,p to define an equivalence relation on S¯n,m,p.
Definition 3.6. Let Ω = (Σ, J,D, {xk, uk, yk}k∈N) and Ω˜ = (Σ˜, J˜ , D˜, {x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N) be elements of S¯n,m,p.
The equivalence relation ∼G on S¯n,m,p denoted by:
Ω ∼G Ω˜,(3.9)
is defined by the existence of ψ ∈ Gn,m,p such that:
Ω˜ = ψ∗Ω;(3.10)
i.e., Σ˜ = ψ∗Σ, J˜ = ψ∗J , D˜ = ψ∗D, and {x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N is given in terms of {xk, uk, yk}k∈N as in (3.2) - (3.4).
The equivalence relation ∼G , in turn, defines equivalence classes in S¯n,m,p. The equivalence class of Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p
defined by the action of Gn,m,p is the set:
[Ω] , {Ω′ ∈ S¯n,m,p|∃ψ ∈ Gn,m,p such that Ω
′ = ψ∗Ω}
= {ψ∗Ω|ψ ∈ Gn,m,p}.(3.11)
This equivalence class is also called the orbit of Ω under action of Gn,m,p.
To facilitate further results, let us show that Gn,m,p is a Lie group acting on S¯n,m,p.
Lemma 3.7. The group Gn,m,p is a Lie group of dimension n(n+1)+m(n+1)+m
2+p(p+1) acting smoothly
on S¯n,m,p.
Proof. It was previously established that Gn,m,p is a group. It is a Lie group because it is a Cartesian product
of smooth manifolds (i.e., general linear groups and vector spaces of various dimensions) and its multiplication
and inversion maps are smooth. Moreover, since the dimension of a product of smooth manifolds is equal to
the sum of the factors’ dimensions, the dimension of Gn,m,p is n(n+1)+m(n+1)+m
2+ p(p+1) [20, p. 21].
The group Gn,m,p acts smoothly on S¯n,m,p since its action involves matrix multiplication and matrix inversion:
the former results in every element of the product being a polynomial function of the elements of the factors,
while the latter is smooth by Cramer’s rule [20]. 
The next result shows that when the cloud optimizes J˜ and the plant replaces each yk with output y˜k, the
resulting sequence of inputs u˜ can be used to reconstruct a sequence of inputs u that optimizes J . Its proof
amounts to using the change of variables (3.2)-(3.4).
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Lemma 3.8. Let Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p and ψ ∈ Gn,m,p. Suppose the cloud solves the optimization problem:
min
u˜
J˜(x˜, u˜)
subject to Dˆηˆi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., N},
for the plant Σ˜ = ψ∗Σ and the sequence u˜
∗ is a unique solution of this optimization problem. Then, the unique
solution of the optimization problem:
min
u
J(x, u)
subject to Dηi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., N}
for the plant Σ is the sequence u∗ such that u∗i = G
−1(u˜∗i − Fxi) for all i ∈ {0, ..., N}.
4. Solving the control-over-the-cloud
privacy problem
4.1. Enforcing privacy. The main reason for using isomorphisms is to preclude the cloud from distinguishing
between isomorphic systems. We now formalize the notion of indistinguishability.
Definition 4.1. A protocol renders two quadruples Ω and Ω˜ indistinguishable by the cloud if the exchanged
messages, when using the protocol between the cloud and the plant Ω, and the exchanged messages, when
using the protocol between the cloud and the plant Ω˜, can be made the same.
The results from Section 3 allow us to construct a communication protocol between the plant and the cloud
that, as will be further shown, solves Problems 2.1-2.3. We start by detailing this protocol.
Algorithm 1 Secure communication
Input: Plant: ψ, Σ, J , D, u˜k;
Cloud: y˜k, Σ˜, J˜ , D˜
Output: Plant: Σ˜, J˜ , D˜, y˜k;
Cloud: u˜k
Phase 1: Handshaking :
1: Plant: Encode Σ, J , D into Σ˜ = ψ∗Σ, J˜ = ψ∗J and D˜ = ψ∗D;
2: Plant: Send Σ˜, J˜ , and D˜ to the cloud;
Phase 2: Execution :
3: Plant: Encode measurement yk into y˜k = Syk and send y˜k to the cloud;
4: Cloud: Use the received y˜k to estimate x˜k and compute u˜k minimizing J˜ subject to the constraints D˜ and
the dynamics Σ˜;
5: Cloud: Send u˜k to the plant;
6: Plant: Use the isomorphism ψ to decode u˜k and produce uk using (3.3);
7: Plant: Apply uk to the actuators.
From Lemma 3.8, we see that Algorithm 1 provides the plant with the inputs uk that satisfy the original
control objective — i.e., the plant’s trajectory minimizes cost J under affine constraints D.
Let us note how all the required computations in this algorithm are matrix multiplications, which means
that both handshaking and execution can be performed in O(k3) time, where k = max{n,m, p}. However,
performing matrix multiplications of constant matrices (e.g., G−1F ) in advance would reduce the complexity
of the execution to O(k2). Both of these complexities were calculated only for the client side (i.e., Plant) of
the algorithm.
Let us now show that applying this protocol indeed makes any two systems in the same equivalence class
indistinguishable from each other.
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Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 1 renders isomorphic systems Ω = (Σ, J,D, {xk, uk, yk}k∈N) and Ω˜ = (Σ˜, J˜ , D˜, {x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N)
indistinguishable by the cloud.
Proof. Since Ω and Ω˜ are isomorphic, there exists an isomorphism ψ such that ψ∗Σ = Σ˜, ψ∗J = J˜ , and
ψ∗D = D˜. Indistinguishibility of Ω and Ω˜ will be shown by running two instances of Algorithm 1: one with
Ω and ψ as inputs, the other - with Ω˜ and the identity isomorphism ψe. Let us denote the communication
algorithm described in Algorithm 1 applied to Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p with the selected isomorphism ψ ∈ Gn,m,p by
Alg(Ω, ψ). During handshaking:
• when Alg(Ω, ψ) is executed, the plant sends ψ∗Σ, ψ∗J , and ψ∗D;
• when Alg(Ω˜, ψe) is executed (ψe is the identity of Gn,m,p), the plant sends Σ˜, J˜ , and matrix D˜
unprotected.
Thus, the communicated dynamics and optimization problems are the same. During execution:
• when Alg(Ω, ψ) is executed, ψ takes trajectories {xk, uk, yk}k∈N of Σ to trajectories {x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N of
ψ∗Σ;
• when Alg(Ω˜, ψe) is executed, the trajectories are {x˜k, u˜k, y˜k}k∈N.
Therefore, the cloud receives the same measurements from both plants. In response, since both plants com-
municated the same optimization problem, the cloud sends the same control inputs to both plant Ω and
Ω˜. 
The result described in Theorem 4.2 states that the cloud cannot differentiate between any two plants, costs,
constraints or trajectories contained in the same equivalence class of the ∼G-equivalence relation, thereby
protecting the privacy of the system. In the next section, we quantify the amount of privacy provided by
Algorithm 1.
4.2. Quantifying privacy. Privacy is created by preventing the cloud from knowing which quadruple Ω in
its equivalence class [Ω] it is interacting with. Clearly, the larger the equivalence class, the more privacy is
ensured. Since each equivalence class has infinitely many elements, cardinality cannot be used as a measure
of privacy. In this section, we show that each equivalence class is a smooth manifold and we quantify privacy
using the dimension of this manifold.
4.2.1. Preliminaries: stabilizer subgroups and their dimensions. The stabilizer subgroup of Gn,m,p for any
Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p, denoted by Kn,m,p(Ω), is defined by:
(4.1) Kn,m,p(Ω) = {ψ ∈ Gn,m,p|ψ∗Ω = Ω}.
The subgroup Kn,m,p(Ω) must be a subset of the symmetry subgroup Kn,m,p(Σ) since it must preserve the
dynamics.
In [25], Respondek gives a characterization of the symmetries of controllable pairs (A,B). Since when consider-
ing pairs (A,B) the output is not relevant, the isomorphisms of (A,B) degenerate into the form φ = (P, F,G),
where the matrices P , F and G are defined to be the same as their counterparts in Definition 3.1. We denote
the group of these isomorphisms by Gn,m. The group action of Gn,m is given by:
φ∗(A,B) = (P (A− BG
−1F )P−1, PBG−1).(4.2)
Let us define the symmetry subgroup of controllable systems (A,B) as:
Kn,m(A,B) = {φ ∈ Gn,m|φ∗(A,B) = (A,B)}.(4.3)
The next proposition summarizes the results of [25] that are relevant to this paper and complements them
with the results from [4]:
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Proposition 4.3. Let (A,B) be a controllable pair. Then:
dim Kn,m(A,B) = mn−
r1∑
i=1
κi−1∑
j=1
rj +m
= m(n+ 1)−
m∑
i=2
ri−1ri,
where:
r1 = rank B,
ri = rank Si−1(A,B)− rank Si−2(A,B), i = 2, ...,m,
Sj(A,B) =
[
B AB ... AjB
]
, j = 1, ...,m− 1.
and {κi}
m
i=1 are controllability indices of (A,B).
This result can be used to estimate the dimension of Kn,m,p(Σ). If Σ = (A,B,C), then, from Proposition
4.3, we know the dimension of Kn,m(A,B) and that any φ ∈ Kn,m(A,B) satisfies φ∗(A,B) = (A,B). Given
φ = (P, F,G) ∈ Kn,m(A,B), finding a corresponding ψ = (P, F,G, S) ∈ Kn,m,p(Σ) requires finding S such that
C = SCP−1. Since we assume C has linearly independent rows, for a given P , this equation has at most one
solution. A solution exists if and only if Im CT ⊂ Im P−TCT [19]. Let Q(A,B,C) be the subset of Kn,m(A,B)
defined by the elements (P, F,G) for which a unique solution to C = SCP−1 exists. It can be seen that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between Q(A,B,C) and Kn,m,p(Σ). Since Q(A,B,C) ⊂ Kn,m(A,B), this gives
an upper bound on the dimension of the symmetry subgroup:
dim Kn,m,p(Σ) ≤ dim Kn,m,p(A,B).(4.4)
Lemma 4.4. For any Ω = (Σ, J,D, {xk, uk, yk}k∈N) ∈ S¯n,m,p,
dim Kn,m,p(Ω) ≤ dim Kn,m,p(Σ) ≤ dim Kn,m,p(A,B),
where dim Kn,m,p(A,B) is given by Proposition 4.3.
Let us consider a special case, in which the dimension of Kn,m,p(Σ) can be computed exactly.
Definition 4.5. A system Σ ∈ Sn,m,p is said to be a prime system if it is ∼G-equivalent to the system of the
form:
(4.5) Σ :


x
(i,1)
k+1 = x
(i,2)
k ,
...
x
(i,κi)
k+1 = u
(i)
k ,
y
(i)
k = x
(i,1)
k , 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
where xk =
[
x
(1,1)
k , ..., x
(1,κ1)
k , ..., x
(m,1)
k , ..., x
(m,κm)
k
]T
∈ Rn and {κi}
m
i=1 are controllability indices of (A,B).
For prime systems we have the following characterization of the dimension of Kn,m,p(Σ).
Lemma 4.6. Let Σ ∈ Sn,m,p be a prime system. Then,
dim Kn,m,p(Σ) =
m∑
i=1
rκi +m,(4.6)
where
r1 = rank B,
ri = rank Si−1(A,B)− rank Si−2(A,B), i = 2, ...,m,
Sj(A,B) =
[
B AB ... AjB
]
, j = 1, ...,m− 1,
and {κi}
m
i=1 are controllability indices of (A,B).
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Proof. Without loss of generality, let us consider a prime system of the form (4.5). From Proposition 2 in [25],
we can see that if a system is prime, a symmetry ψ = (P, F,G, S) is uniquely defined by a transformation on
its outputs (i.e., by transformation S).
We want to show that, in order to define a symmetry, transformation S needs to be constructed in such a
way that each transformed output y˜
(i)
k is an affine function of outputs y
(j)
k with relative degrees greater or
equal than that of y
(i)
k . To simplify notation, we prove this claim for the example with controllability indices
κ1 = κ2 = 2, κ3 = 1, although the employed arguments apply to any prime system:
x
(1,1)
k+1 = x
(1,2)
k x
(2,1)
k+1 = x
(2,2)
k x
(3,1)
k+1 = u
(3)
k
x
(1,2)
k+1 = u
(1)
k x
(2,2)
k+1 = u
(2)
k(4.7)
y
(1)
k = x
(1,1)
k y
(2)
k = x
(2,1)
k y
(3)
k = x
(3,1)
k .
We will show, by contradiction, that if S produces a transformed output based on outputs of a smaller relative
degree, then S cannot be part of a symmetry. In other words, there exist no matrices P , F , and G such that
the quadruple (P, F,G, S) satisfies the equations:
A = P (A−BG−1F )P−1(4.8)
B = PBG−1(4.9)
C = SCP−1.(4.10)
Assume that (4.8)-(4.10) are satisfied and that S contains non-zero elements Sij if κi > κj (i.e., the transformed
output uses outputs of a smaller relative degree). From (4.10), we have that:
SCAqB = CPAqB, ∀ 0 ≤ q < κ1.(4.11)
By using (4.8) and (4.9), the following relation can be shown:
PA = AP + PBG−1F = AP + BF.(4.12)
Recursively substituting (4.12) into (4.11) results in:
SCAqB = C(PA)Aq−1B = C(AP +BF )Aq−1B
= CBFAq−1B + CAPAq−1B
= CBFAq−1B + CA(PA)Aq−2B
= . . .
=
q−1∑
l=0
CAlBFAq−l−1B + CAqPB.
Equation (4.9) implies that PB = BG and, thus, leads to:
SCAqB =
q−1∑
l=0
CAlBFAq−l−1B + CAqBG.(4.13)
Note that CAlB is a diagonal matrix such that:
[CAlB]ii =
{
1, if κi = l + 1
0, otherwise.
(4.14)
In other words, this diagonal matrix marks the indices corresponding to the outputs of equal relative degree.
In addition, the expression FAq−l−1B is an m×m matrix composed out of elements of F (recall that A and
B are in the form (4.5)).
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The left-hand side of (4.13) selects the columns of S corresponding to the outputs of relative degree κi = q+1.
For the example in (4.7), taking q = 0 gives:
SCB =

0 0 S130 0 S23
0 0 S33

 .(4.15)
The right-hand side of (4.13) fills the rows corresponding to the outputs of relative degree smaller or equal
than κi = q + 1 with values from G. In case of example in (4.7), the right-hand side, given q = 0, is:
CBG =

0 0 00 0 0
× × ×

 .(4.16)
Thus, the equality in (4.13), which was derived using the definition of symmetry, forces Sij to zero if κi > κj .
In the example in (4.7), this leads to S13 = S23 = 0. This contradicts the assumption that S produces a
transformed output based on outputs of a smaller relative degree.
This idea can be generalized to any prime system and, therefore, each transformed output y˜
(i)
k can only be an
affine function of outputs y
(j)
k with relative degrees greater or equal than that of y
(i)
k .
The number of outputs y
(j)
k with a relative degree greater or equal to that of y
(i)
k (i.e., greater or equal than
ki) is equal to rki [4]. Therefore, each modified output y
(i)
k is an affine function with rki arguments and a
non-zero constant term, thus leading to the equality:
dim Kn,m,p =
m∑
i=1
(rki + 1) =
m∑
i=1
(rki) +m.(4.17)

4.2.2. Main results. Consider the scenario from Problem 2.1, in which the cloud does not know anything about
the system. In this scenario, the plant encodes Ω using an isomorphism ψ = (P, F,G, S) that can be regarded
as a private key used to encode and decode the information exchanged with the cloud. This isomorphism ψ is
chosen from Gn,m,p, the group of all isomorphisms.
Proposition 4.7. Let Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p. Then, under the scenario described in Problem 2.1, the cloud cannot
distinguish between Ω and any other system in the uncertainty set [Ω]G (i.e., the equivalence class of Ω defined
by the action of Gn,m,p) of dimension:
dim Gn,m,p − dim Kn,m,p(Ω),(4.18)
if Algorithm 1 is used.
This implies that the dimension of [Ω]G is greater or equal than:
n(n+ 1) +m2 + p(p+ 1) +
m∑
i=2
ri−1ri,(4.19)
where ri is given in Lemma 4.3.
For Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p such that its corresponding Σ ∈ Sn,m,p is prime, this implies that the dimension of [Ω]G is
greater or equal to:
n(n+ 1) +mn+m2 + p(p+ 1)−
m∑
i=1
rκi ,(4.20)
where rκi is given in Lemma 4.6.
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Proof. From Theorem 4.2, we know that Algorithm 1 renders isomorphic systems indistinguishable by the
cloud. Therefore, the uncertainty set is the set of systems isomorphic to [Ω]G - namely, the equivalence class
of Ω defined by the action of Gn,m,p.
Let us define a map:
θΩ : Gn,m,p → S¯n,m,p
ψ 7→ ψ∗Ω.
Here, θΩ is smooth because, as shown in Lemma 3.7, Gn,m,p acts smoothly on S¯n,m,p. The stabilizer set can
be defined by:
Kn,m,p(Ω) = (θΩ)
−1(Ω) = {ψ|ψ∗Ω = Ω}.
Since θΩ and its inverse are smooth and, therefore, continuous, the subgroup Kn,m,p(Ω) is closed.
By Theorem 21.17 in [20], the quotient space Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω) is a smooth manifold of dimension dim Gn,m,p−
dim Kn,m,p(Ω) such that the quotient map pi : Gn,m,p → Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω) is a smooth submersion.
Now, let us define a map:
ΘΩ : Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω)→ S¯n,m,p
ψKn,m,p(Ω) 7→ ψ∗Ω,
where ψKn,m,p(Ω) is a left coset of Kn,m,p(Ω). It can be shown that ΘΩ is well-defined.
By Theorem 4.29 in [20], ΘΩ is smooth because θΩ = ΘΩ ◦ pi is smooth and pi is a smooth submersion.
It can be shown that the map ΘΩ is equivariant (see [20, p. 164]) and, therefore, by the equivariant rank
theorem [20, p. 165], we have that ΘΩ has a constant rank.
Let us show that ΘΩ is injective. If ΘΩ(ψ1Kn,m,p(Ω)) = ΘΩ(ψ2Kn,m,p(Ω)), then (ψ1)∗Ω = (ψ2)∗Ω. This
implies that (ψ1)
−1ψ2 ∈ Kn,m,p(Ω) and, therefore, ψ1Kn,m,p(Ω) = ψ2Kn,m,p(Ω). Therefore, ΘΩ is a smooth
immersion.
By Proposition 5.18 in [20], the image of ΘΩ (i.e., the equivalence class [Ω]G) is an immersed submanifold such
that ΘΩ : Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω) → [Ω]G is a diffeomorphism and, therefore, the dimension of [Ω]G is equal to the
dimension of Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω).
A more concrete quantification of privacy can be given for various special cases. Using the results of Proposition
4.3 and Lemma 4.4, we have that, for any Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p, the uncertainty sets under the scenario described in
Problem 2.1 are smooth manifolds of dimension greater or equal to the value in (4.19)
The dimension of the uncertainty sets can be shown to be greater or equal to the value in (4.20) using Lemma
4.6. 
Proposition 4.7 can be used to quantify privacy of other scenarios presented in Section 2.
Consider the scenario in Problem 2.2, where the cloud does not know the dynamics but knows which sensors
and actuators will be used. An arbitrary isomorphism can no longer be used for encoding since it could lead to
inputs and outputs that are inconsistent with existing sensors and actuators. This inconsistency would signal
the cloud that the plant is being dishonest about its measurements and provide the cloud with an opportunity
to exploit this fact to gather additional knowledge. Therefore, we need to restrict the group of isomorphisms
used for encoding. These isomorphisms are given by any composition of ψ1 = (P, 0, I, I) for any P ∈ GL(n,R)
and ψ2 ∈ Kn,m,p(Σ). It can be shown that this set of isomorphisms forms a subgroup that we denote by
Hn,m,p(Σ) ⊂ Gn,m,p.
Corollary 4.8. Let Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p. Then, under the scenario described in Problem 2.2, the cloud cannot distin-
guish between Ω and any other system in the uncertainty set [Ω]H (i.e., the equivalence class of Ω defined by
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the action of Hn,m,p) of dimension:
dim Hn,m,p(Σ)− dim Kn,m,p(Ω),(4.21)
if Algorithm 1 is used. This implies that the dimension of [Ω]H is greater or equal to n(n+ 1).
Proof. From Theorem 4.2, we know that Algorithm 1 renders isomorphic systems indistinguishable by the
cloud. However, the uncertainty set is no longer the equivalence class under the entire group of isomorphisms
Gn,m,p, but the equivalence class under a smaller group Hn,m,p(Σ) denoted by [Ω]H.
It can be shown that Hn,m,p(Σ) is a Lie subgroup of Gn,m,p. This subgroup Hn,m,p(Σ) can be thought of
as a product manifold of Kn,m,p(Σ) and a space of invertible affine maps. Since the dimension of a product
manifold is a sum of its factors’ dimensions, we have:
dim Hn,m,p(Σ) = dim Kn,m,p(Σ) + n(n+ 1).
The result follows by applying Proposition 4.7 to Hn,m,p(Σ). Using the result from Lemma 4.4, we can see
that the dimension of the uncertainty set for any Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p is greater or equal to n(n+ 1). 
Finally, in the scenario described in Problem 2.3, where the cloud possesses the complete knowledge of dy-
namics, only the isomorphisms from the symmetry subgroup ψ ∈ Kn,m,p(Σ) can be used. To provide privacy
guarantees for this scenario, let us assume that we have n + 1 linearly independent constraints on the state
xk expressed by the constraint matrix D. This is a reasonable assumption because systems often have an
operational envelope bounding the states. Therefore, any ψ ∈ Kn,m,p(Ω) must satisfy:
DL−1 = D ⇐⇒ DL = D
⇐⇒
[
D11 0
D21 D22
] [
P 0
F G
]
=
[
D11 0
D21 D22
]
=⇒ D11P = D11.
Given that D11 ∈ R
h1×(n+1) is injective, the last equality is satisfied if and only if P = I. Since P uniquely
defines F , G and S, we also have that the only isomorphism that keeps (A,B,C,D11) invariant is ψ = ψe =
(I, 0, I, I) . Therefore, the only element of Kn,m,p(Ω) is φe = (I, 0, I, I) and dim Kn,m,p(Ω) = 0.
Corollary 4.9. Let Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p. Then, under the scenario described in Problem 2.3, the cloud cannot distin-
guish between Ω and any other system in the uncertainty set [Ω]K (i.e., the equivalence class of Ω defined by
the action of Kn,m,p) of dimension:
dim Kn,m,p(Σ)− dim Kn,m,p(Ω),(4.22)
if Algorithm 1 is used.
When the constraint matrix D contains n+ 1 linearly independent constraints on the state, the dimension of
the uncertainty set is equal to dim Kn,m,p(Σ), which is greater or equal to:
m(n+ 1)−
m∑
i=2
ri−1ri
.
Moreover, for any Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p such that its corresponding Σ ∈ Sn,m,p is prime, the dimension of [Ω]K is equal
to
m∑
i=1
rki +m
.
Proof. The proof of this statement is similar to that of Corollary 4.8. The dimensions of equivalence classes
for prime and general systems were evaluated using results of Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.6. 
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5. Side knowledge
The privacy guarantees derived in Section 4 are compromised when the adversary has partial information
about the encoding isomorphism. In our problem formulation, we assume that the cloud may have learned
those through some external channels or through some prior knowledge about the system.
Recall that by Lemma 3.7, Gn,m,p is a Lie group of dimension n(n + 1) +m(n + 1) +m
2 + p(p+ 1). In this
section, we assume that the constraint matrix D has n+ 1 linearly independent constraints on the state and,
therefore, as shown in the previous section, Kn,m,p(Ω) = {ψe}, where ψe is the identity element of Gn,m,p.
Suppose the cloud has partial knowledge about the encoding isomorphism. We shall represent the partial
knowledge available to the cloud as a projection from Gn,m,p onto a k-dimensional vector space. Let us define
ρ : Gn,m,p → R
k to be a surjective map of constant rank k, providing side knowledge about the encoding
isomorphism. Then, we can say that the cloud knows some vector l ∈ Rk, where:
l = ρ(P, F,G, S).(5.1)
Note that this map is not known to us, and the results that follow do not require the knowledge of this map.
Side knowledge does not change the result of Theorem 4.2, however the privacy guaranteed by the scheme
changes. It is obvious that the size of the uncertainty set defined by isomorphisms that satisfy (5.1) is no
greater and, in general, smaller thanif no side knowledge is available. Moreover, the uncertainty set is no
longer neither an orbit nor an equivalence class because the preimage of ρ does not necessarily have a group
structure.
Let us show that the object defined by (5.1) on Gn,m,p is still a manifold.
Lemma 5.1. Let Gn,m,p be the group of all isomorphisms, ρ : Gn,m,p → R
k be a surjective map of constant
rank k and assume the cloud knows that l = ρ(P, F,G, S). Then, ρ−1(l), representing the possible encoding
isomorphisms used by the client, is a properly embedded submanifold of Gn,m,p. Its dimension is dim Gn,m,p−k.
Proof. By the global rank theorem [20, p. 83], since ρ is a surjective map of constant rank k, it is a smooth
submersion. From the submersion level set theorem [20, p. 105], since both Gn,m,p and R
k are smooth
manifolds and ρ is a smooth submersion, we have that ρ−1(l) is a properly embedded submanifold of dimension
dim Gn,m,p − dim R
k = n(n+ 1) +m(n+ 1) +m2 + p(p+ 1)− k. 
Let us now consider the map ΘΩ defined earlier in Proposition 4.7. Since Kn,m,p(Ω) = ψe, we have that
Gn,m,p/Kn,m,p(Ω) is equivalent to Gn,m,p. Therefore, the map ΘΩ is equivalent to the orbit map θΩ. It was
shown in Proposition 4.7 that ΘΩ is injective. The image of ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)) constitutes the uncertainty set,
between the elements of which the cloud is not be able to distinguish. Therefore, the main result of this
section requires finding the dimension of ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)).
Proposition 5.2. Assume Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p is such that the constraint matrix D has n + 1 linearly independent
constraints on the state. Suppose that Algorithm 1 is used and the cloud has the following side knowledge about
the selected isomorphism ψ:
ρ(P, F,G, S) = l ∈ Rk,
where ρ : Gn,m,p → R
k is a surjective map of constant rank k. Then, under the scenario described in Problem
2.1, the cloud cannot distinguish between Ω and any other system in the uncertainty set U = ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)) of
dimension:
dim Gn,m,p − k = n(n+ 1) +m(n+ 1) +m
2 + p(p+ 1)− k.(5.2)
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, Algorithm 1 renders isomorphic systems indistinguishable by the cloud. However,
the cloud knows that we use an isomorphism ψ ∈ ρ−1(l) and, therefore, the uncertainty set is no longer
the equivalence class under the entire group of isomorphisms Gn,m,p, but the subset of this equivalence class
U = ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)).
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By the property of the orbit map [20, p. 166], for each Ω, the orbit map ΘΩ is smooth and has constant
rank. Since ΘΩ is also injective, we have, by the Global Rank Theorem, that it is a smooth immersion [20, p.
83]. As it was shown in Lemma 5.1, the set ρ−1(l) is an embedded submanifold of Gn,m,p and, therefore, the
inclusion map i : ρ−1(l)→ Gn,m,p is a smooth embedding.
The map ΘΩ ◦ i is a smooth immersion because it is a composition of smooth immersions. Since images of
smooth immersions are smooth immersed submanifolds (by Proposition 5.18 from [20]), the uncertainty set
U = ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)) is a smooth immersed submanifold of S¯n,m,p diffeomorphic to ρ
−1(l) and, hence, has the same
dimension (refer to Lemma 5.1).
Using Lemma 3.7, the dimension of the uncertainty set is evaluated to be:
n(n+ 1) +m(n+ 1) +m2 + p(p+ 1)− k.

Remark: although Proposition 5.2 was proved under the assumption that D has n + 1 linearly independent
constraints on the state, this assumption can be dropped if we assume the intersection of ρ−1(l) and the left
cosets of Kn,m,p(Ω) in G is well-behaved.
This result shows that the proposed scheme degrades gracefully with side knowledge — i.e., side knowledge
allows the cloud to reduce the dimension of the uncertainty set only by the amount of side knowledge and not
more. Moreover, this result can be generalized for other scenarios considered in Section 4.2.2 using similar
proofs.
Corollary 5.3. Assume Ω ∈ S¯n,m,p is such that the constraint matrix D has n + 1 linearly independent
constraints on the state. Suppose that Algorithm 1 is used and the cloud has the following side knowledge
l ∈ Rk about the selected isomorphism ψ:
l = ρ(P, F,G, S),
where ρ : Gn,m,p → R
k is a surjective map of constant rank k. Then, under the scenario described in Problem
2.2, the cloud cannot distinguish between Ω and any other system in the uncertainty set U = ΘΩ(ρ
−1(l)) of
dimension:
dim Hn,m,p(Σ)− k.(5.3)
Under the scenario described in Problem 2.3, the dimension of the uncertainty set is:
dim Kn,m,p(Σ)− k.(5.4)
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a transformation-based method to preserve privacy in control over the cloud. In
addition to its low computational overhead, we have formally shown that this method precludes the adversary
from inferring the private data by eavesdopping on the messages exchanged between the plant and the cloud.
We quantified the guaranteed privacy via the dimension of the set that describes the uncertainty experienced
by the adversary. The problem of computing the dimension of the stabilizer set Kn,m,p(Ω) remains open, and
its solution requires a detailed analysis of system-theoretic properties. The authors are currently investigating
other measures of privacy that may lead to a deeper insight into the proposed method.
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